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SIMON BRAND MEMORIAL ADDRESS: 
 
THE IMPACT OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION ON 




Your Conference Organising Committee has done me a signal honour in asking me to deliver 
the Simon Brand Memorial Lecture. Indeed, I feel doubly honoured since Simon Brand was a 
personal friend of mine and someone whom I held in high esteem. He was a man of integrity, 
and this, together with his intellectual rigour, led to his being highly respected by all shades 
of political opinion. He played an important role in supporting socio-political change in 
South Africa, and I have no doubt that, but for his untimely death, he would have assumed 
an even more important role in the new South Africa post-1994. One of the fields in which he 
had become increasingly interested was that of economic cooperation across the Southern 
African region. As Simon Brand was an agricultural economist by training, I hope he would 
have approved of the topic which I have chosen to consider in this lecture.  
 
THE STATE OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION 
 
We live in a period both of growing globalism and regionalism. Multilateral 
trade liberalisation, sealed by the Marrakech Agreement of 1994 and the 
establishment of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995, has been 
paralleled by the proliferation of regional trade blocs, most of which are still 
engaged in the difficult process of tariff elimination. Regionalism has its critics 
- indeed, it is generally agreed that the optimal policy for any country is 
unilaterally to liberalise its trade on a most-favoured-nation basis - and, if it is 
to be a building block rather than a stumbling block towards free global trade, 
a regional bloc should ensure that its members maintain the impetus of 
lowering tariffs against third countries. 
 
Southern Africa is an unusual region in that it boasts of the longest surviving 
customs union in the world. This is the Southern African Customs Union 
(SACU) comprising South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and 
Swaziland. Since the trade effects of this arrangement have already worked 
themselves out, it will not be the focus of this paper. Rather, what is pertinent 
for our purposes is the impact of new regional trade initiatives of which there 
are several. These need to be described in brief. 
 
The first is the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). This 
                     




has grown out of the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern 
African States (PTA) which commenced operations in 1983. The focus was on 
the gradual reduction of tariffs on a common list of commodities for intra-
PTA trade. The PTA was transformed into COMESA from the beginning of 
1994, the aim being the establishment of a free trade area in 2000 and a 
customs union in 2004. The name, therefore, is a misnomer. COMESA has 21 
members: this includes the Seychelles which has only just joined. However, 
membership will fall to 19 at the end of the year when Lesotho and 
Mozambique intend to leave. The other countries which are not members are 
South Africa, Botswana and Somalia.  
 
An important advance in the COMESA Treaty of 1993 is that it made 
provision for a multi-speed approach towards free trade, i.e., for certain 
members to move more quickly than others. This is often referred to in the 
literature as ‘variable geometry’. In the context of Eastern and Southern 
Africa, variable geometry is reflected in the second grouping.  
 
This is the Cross-border Initiative (CBI) which consists of a fast-track group of 
14 countries, all of which are members of COMESA. This grouping in 1995 
agreed to abolish tariffs on intra-CBI trade, that is, to have free trade among 
themselves, by October 1998. They also agreed to establish a harmonised 
external tariff by that date. A harmonised external tariff is not the same as the 
common external tariff of a customs union in that it allows some scope for 
flexibility: in the case of the CBI, a member country may adopt a tariff of 0-10-
20 per cent or one of 5-15-25 per cent for raw materials/capital goods, 
intermediate goods and consumer goods respectively. 
 
Some of the COMESA and CBI countries also belong to the third grouping, 
namely, the Southern African Development Community (SADC). This 
organisation had its antecedents in a grouping of nine countries established in 
1980 with a focus on sectoral cooperation. Its transformation in 1992 saw it 
add trade integration to its armoury. A Trade Protocol was signed by 11 of the 
then 12 member countries in 1996, and would take effect when ratified by 
two-thirds, i.e., eight, of the member countries. A free trade area would then 
be established within eight years of ratification. At present only two members 
have ratified the protocol, while a further two countries - the Congo and 
Seychelles - were admitted to membership in September 1997. Assuming that 
the Trade Protocol is able to come into effect in 1998, a free trade area should 
then be established by 2006. 
 
Although some mention will be made in this lecture of COMESA and the CBI, 




and Seychelles. The reason for this is that work on intra-SADC trade(Imani, 
1997b), on which much of this lecture is based, has been limited to the 12 
countries. However, mention will also be made of a further possible free trade 
agreement, i.e., the one between South Africa and the European Union. This 
would have some important consequences for South Africa’s partners in 
regional trade blocs, and studies have been done of the consequences for the 
SACU countries.  
 
INTRA-SADC TRADE STATISTICS 
 
Trade data in the SADC countries as a whole are most unsatisfactory with 
regard to availability, quality and comparability. In order to analyse intra-
regional trade, the researcher requires, for each member country, data on 
imports and exports at a disaggregated level (preferably the 8-digit HS level) 
by country of origin and destination both in SADC and the rest of the world 
(ROW); levels of tariffs and charges of equivalent effect (such as excise duties 
and import surcharges); and customs revenue collections. Moreover, the data 
are required for a similar time period for purposes of comparison. The 
researcher has to tiptoe through a veritable minefield: data are not available 
for all member countries for like periods, or at similar levels of 
disaggregation, and some figures make no sense in relation to other 
comparable statistics, different sources giving different values.  
 
Thus, in a recent study of tariff reductions under the SADC Trade Protocol 
(Imani, 1997b) which attempted to collect data on intra-SADC trade for the 
three years 1993-95, no statistics were available on Angola. For the remaining 
11 countries, the value of intra-trade given by exporting countries 
considerably exceeded that given by importing countries. Availability and 
quality of data are among the reasons for this discrepancy, but other 
explanatory factors are the time lag between dates of exporting and 
importing, and exchange rate fluctuations. For the purposes of this paper, the 
import and export figures for these three years are aggregated in Table 1. 
 
The notes to the table are sufficient to indicate that these figures (all provided 
by the governments with the exception of Lesotho for which the figures were 
clearly incorrect and consequently had to be obtained from another source) 
are not comprehensive and cannot be taken as anything but a rough 
indication only. Of course, researchers can work only with the data provided, 
but the extent to which the use of sophisticated analytical techniques may 
then be justified is limited.  
 




other work. The most notable are: 
Table 1:  Value of Intra-SADC Trade, 1993-95 ($’000) 
 
  Reported Imports  Reported Exports 
Country Value  %  Value  % 
Angola n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
Botswana 4,456,751  21.9  1,096,441  9.5 
Lesotho(a) 2,311,630  11.4  222,700  1.9 
Malawi 717,099(b) 3.5  207,426(b) 1.8 
Mauritius 699,911  3.4  42,641  0.4 
Mozambique 617,645(b) 3.0  191,101(b) 1.7 
Namibia 3,772,140  18.5  795,615(c) 6.9 
South Africa  1,277,436 6.3  5,527,772  48.0 
Swaziland 2,714,905  13.3 1,611,526  14.0 
Tanzania 445,888(b) 2.2  121,950(d) 1.0 
Zambia 877,277(b) 4.3  152,443(b) 1.3 
Zimbabwe 2,496,580  12.3 1,550,385  13.5 
Total 20,337,262  100.0  11,520,000  100.0 
 
Notes:  (a)  Intra-SACU trade only. 
  (b)  No data for 1993; 1994 figures substituted. 
  (c)  No data for 1994 and 1995; 1993 figures substituted. 
  (d)  No data for 1993-95; 1996 figures substituted. 
Source:  Imani Development (International) Ltd; Economist Intelligence Unit 
(for Lesotho). 
 
(i)  The bulk of intra-regional trade occurs within the SACU area. The 
BLNS countries together account for 65 per cent of intra-SADC trade, 
and almost all of this is from South Africa. Of total intra-regional 
exports, South Africa and the BLNS countries together account for 80 
per cent, and most of this is among themselves. 
 
(ii)  If trade with South Africa were to be excluded, intra-regional trade 
among the remaining countries would amount to no more than about 
4-5 per cent of their total foreign trade. For all SADC countries their 
intra-regional trade is dwarfed by comparison with their trade with 
the ROW, and this position will not change materially in a free trade 
area. Like many other regional blocs, SADC approaches a free trade 
area from a low base. 
 




to intra-regional trade is Zimbabwe. The three-year period for which 
data were collected is too short for any trend to be discerned, but there 
appears to have been a substantial growth in the value of reported 
exports. About 75 per cent of this growth was attributable to South 
Africa. This probably reflected the easing of political barriers to trade 
with some SADC countries, and hence the opening of new markets by 
South African exporters.  
 
(iv)  South Africa is the only country which enjoys a favourable balance of 
trade with the region, and this imbalance in favour of South Africa is 
the major problem which the rest of SADC is anticipating will be dealt 
with in a free trade area together with other protocols for trade in 
power and water.  
 
Excluded from the above, of course, is informal cross-border trade. A number 
of studies undertaken for COMESA (Kallungia, 1997; Chirwa, Lungu and 
Mkanda, 1997) of cross-border trade involving several SADC countries did 
not quantify its extent, but Ndlela (1996) mentions estimates of informal trade 
of between 15-50 per cent of total official trade. He refers to a 1994 study 
conducted at border posts which shows that cereal and grain products, sugar, 
beans, meat, vegetables, fruit and dairy products are all traded across SADC 
borders. Informal trade was stimulated by political instability and drought. It 
would decline as political instability is overcome, tariffs are reduced, 
marketing and prices are deregulated, exchange controls are lifted, and other 
non-tariff barriers are broken down, but its very existence indicates that there 
is a demand for intra-regional trade in these products.  
 
AGRICULTURE IN THE NATIONAL ECONOMIES 
 
Free trade has differential effects in terms of its costs and benefits - among 
member countries as well as among sectors, industries and firms in any 
particular country. Agriculture is an important sector in almost all the SADC 
countries, and it is consequently bound to be affected by a free trade area.  
 
The impact of free trade on the production of any particular agricultural 
commodity in a country will be felt both on the import and export sides. 
Whether a country will import the commodity will depend on the relative 
efficiency of its producers compared with those in competitor partner 
countries, the initial levels of its import duty for the commodity, and the 
elasticity of demand for imports. On the exports side, the country’s producers 
would gain improved access to the markets of the rest of the free trade area.  




Table 2 shows the percentage contribution of agriculture to GDP in the 
various member countries. 
Table 2:  Contribution of Agriculture(a) to GDP (%) 
 
Country Year  % 
Angola 1994  12.2 
Botswana 1994/95  1.5 
Lesotho 1995  9.6 
Malawi 1995  36.8 
Mauritius 1995  9.4 
Mozambique 1994  24.5 
Nairobi 1995  11.7 
South Africa  1995  4.6 
Swaziland 1995  11.3 
Tanzania 1995  54.9 
Zambia 1995  17.1 
Zimbabwe 1994  13.6 
 
Note: (a)  This sector also includes forestry and fishing except in the case of 
Mozambique and Namibia for which fishing is excluded. 
Source:  Official SADC Trade, Industry and Investment Review 1997, 
Gaborone : SADC. 
 
The figures, however, understate the importance of agriculture in GDP since 
many manufacturing sub-sectors are in fact processors of agricultural 
products. In countries such as Swaziland, for example, agro-industry 
(principally sugar and woodpulp) is a major component of the manufacturing 
sector’s contribution to GDP.  
 
Agriculture is also, of course, important in labour absorption in the SADC 
region. In most countries the largest proportion of the population is still rural, 
and is dependent on subsistence agriculture for a livelihood. The subsistence 
and smallholder sectors of agriculture may also be affected by SADC free 
trade, and this needs to be taken into account.  
 
Table 2 also fails to reflect the potential of the agricultural sector and agro-
industry in some countries, notably in Angola and Mozambique in both of 
which commercial farms and estates together with industrial installations 
were devastated in the prolonged civil wars. In the year before independence, 
for example, agriculture was a major sector in the Angola economy. It was the 




other important export crops were sugar, cotton, maize and palm oil. During 
the last 22 years Angola has been a food importer, and it has lost its 
commercial livestock and estate farmers together with its processing plants 
(refineries, abattoirs and packing plants). The potential of the sector, is 
enormous: it could produce almost anything in the food crop line.  
 
Angola’s agricultural sector is now being redeveloped. Foreign investors have 
been invited to bid for the coffee plantations while the privatised sugar estates 
have been bought by a multinational corporation. However, the absence of 
any trade statistics means that Angola was excluded from the analysis in the 
SADC Trade Protocol study. 
 
Agriculture in Mozambique suffered much the same fate as in Angola, but 
political development and economic reforms have been more decisive than in 
Angola with the result that the main export products are from agro-industry 
(excluding fishing). The country has significant untapped land and water 
resources with a potential to produce a wide range of crops especially now 
that agriculture and agro-industry are being opened to the private sector. 
They are already attracting foreign investment, and the World Bank has 
forecast an annual real growth rate of 6.1 per cent for agriculture alone.  
 
The two remaining countries in which agricultural development was retarded 
until recent years - this time by inadequate government policies - are Tanzania 
and Zambia. Both countries are now encouraging foreign investment in 
export agriculture, and some multinational corporations have already 
invested there. Zambia alone has the potential to be the bread-basket of 
Southern Africa with large areas of unutilised arable land and substantial 
unexploited water resources. At present only 15 per cent of its arable land is 
under cultivation. Apart from maize and wheat, a very wide range of crops 
could be produced. With such untapped potential, the opportunities for the 
development of agro-industry are also substantial. 
 
The analysis which follows is based on existing trade data. It is static and does 
not portray the changes which might occur in agriculture and associated 
production in these four countries in the next decade or two.  
 
IMPACT OF FREE TRADE 
 
Major agricultural commodities traded in SADC 
 
In the SADC Trade Protocol study, the terms of reference called for only the 




products and formulate a tariff reduction schedule. Thus, the study did not 
cover the entire agricultural sector. 
 
Data on the 20 major commodities traded by each country within SADC were 
collected for the years 1993-95, although for some countries the full data set 
for the three years was not available. For each country the top 20 commodities 
included some agricultural items. In listing them, forestry and fishing 
products have been excluded as have the category “food preparation” (which 
covers processed foodstuffs) and beverages, wine and juices. Agro-industrial 
products such as refined sugar, meat and flour have been included. The major 
commodities traded are: 
 
•  Meat and live animals 
•  Grain products - wheat, maize, edible flour and meal 
•  Sugar - cane, raw or refined 
•  Tea 
•  Tobacco 
•  Cotton and cotton seeds 
•  Rice  
•  Fruit - citrus, apples. 
   
Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Malawi are the countries for which agricultural 
commodities comprise the largest number of the top 20 regional exports, 
while Botswana and Namibia have the smallest number.  
 
TREATMENT OF AGRICULTURE IN REGIONAL INTEGRATION 
ARRANGEMENTS 
 
When a free trade area is established, the member countries have to agree on a 
schedule for reducing tariffs to zero levels. In terms of the GATT as well as the 
Marrakech Agreement, free trade means “substantially all trade”. This is not 
clearly defined and there is some dispute as to what it entails, but it has been 
taken as meaning approximately 90 per cent of trade by value in all sectors.  
 
In any free trade agreement there are always exclusions as member countries 
seek to protect sensitive sectors. It has been the common experience of 
regional integration arrangements worldwide that the agricultural sector 
gives rise to the major negotiating difficulties in the path of free trade.  
 
In the original schedule for establishing the ASEAN free trade area (AFTA), 




exclusion list while meat products were exempt for an undefined period. It 
was subsequently decided, however, that all agricultural products would be 
included in AFTA, although the time-table for inclusion has not yet been 
decided. As in many parts of the world, agriculture is extremely sensitive 
both economically and politically for many member countries. Thus, whilst 
Indonesia and the Philippines wish to delay for ten years the inclusion of rice 
and sugar, Thailand, the world’s largest producer and exporter of rice, argues 
that any delay would hurt the credibility of AFTA.  
 
Agriculture has also been the laggard in the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA). Although free trade was achieved at the end of 1966 when all import 
tariffs and duties as well as quantitative restrictions were eliminated on intra-
trade, the protective measures were allowed to remain for agricultural goods. 
Trade in agricultural products among member countries was very small 
compared with that in industrial goods, and the agreement merely provided 
for the encouragement of greater trade in agricultural goods although it 
stipulated that direct and indirect subsidies were to be abolished. 
 
In the Common Market of the South (Mercosur) in South America, the list of 
temporary exclusions from tariff reductions was confined mainly to sensitive 
agricultural and industrial products. One product in which there is as yet no 
free trade in Mercosur is sugar. This is principally because it is subsidised in 
Argentina. Brazil, which is an efficient producer, had alternative markets so 
that the exclusion of sugar from free trade did not present a problem. In its 
free trade agreement with Mercosur, Chile negotiated for the phasing out of 
tariffs on a small number of sensitive agricultural products over 15-18 years. 
By comparison, the eight-year time frame set by SADC might appear 
optimistic. 
 
The definition of sensitive products 
 
Since WTO acceptance of a free trade area requires that “substantially all 
trade” be free, it follows that the list of excluded products should be small. 
Moreover, it is generally agreed that permanent exclusion should be avoided, 
and that it would be preferable to double the time allowed for the phasing-in 
of zero tariffs on sensitive products. But there must be some yardstick by 
which to define whether or not a product is sensitive and hence whether or 
not it should qualify for the exclusion list. A product could be regarded as 
sensitive on one or more of the following grounds: 
 
(i)  It might yield a substantial part of the government’s revenue from 




central government revenue in less-developed countries, but they will 
be of declining importance as tariffs are reduced in line with global 
trade liberalisation. Governments, therefore, are having to find 
alternative sources of revenue.  
(ii)  It might be important for reasons of national security. In agriculture, 
food security is an obvious issue as all Southern African countries have 
realised in the face of recent drought. 
 
(iii)  It might be of great political and social importance if it is labour 
intensive. The down-scaling or closure of the industry concerned would 
then lead to a significant increase i n  u n e m p l o y m e n t  a n d  t o  s o c i a l  
hardship. However, employment is not regarded by the WTO as a good 
yardstick for exclusion since, under a free trade area, some new 
companies will open and some existing ones will close.  What is lost on 
the swings might be gained on the roundabouts. 
 
(iv)  It might be critical in the country’s balance of trade. This happens only 
in small economies (such as island economies in the Caribbean) where a 
single industry might account for a large proportion of total export 
revenue, and its failure would then have important balance-of-
payments repercussions.  
 
(v)  It might be in a sub-sector which is inefficient and which depends on 
tariffs for its survival. In many less-developed countries, import-
substituting industrialisation policies led to the establishment of 
industries for which the country had no comparative advantage. If 
tariffs were to be removed, the industry would fail or, in some cases, 
determined efforts might be made to restructure it by means of various 
measures, the South African clothing and textile industry being a good 
example. In agriculture, producers of a particular commodity might not 
be able to survive if subsidies were withdrawn or tariffs lifted. 
Obviously, the more heavily protected sectors are more likely to be 
sensitive than those with low nominal tariffs.  Moreover, a producer is 
likely to be more vulnerable if it has low profit margins and high tariffs, 
or if scale economies are important in which case a fall in production 
would have a more than proportionate effect on profit.   
 
The effective rate of protection (ERP) is a measure which goes some way to 
capturing these varying effects, and is the tool used in the SADC Trade 




value-added as a result of the tariff structure.2  
 
COMPARISON WITH OTHER STUDIES 
 
During the course of the SADC Trade Protocol Study, an attempt was made to 
compare the findings of other studies on intra-regional trade liberalisation in 
Southern Africa.   
 
The IDC (1996) identified sensitive products on the basis of high import 
tariffs.  On this basis the only agricultural product which showed up was 
tobacco (for Zimbabwe, Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique and Malawi).   
 
Evans (1996) used an economic policy model to estimate the effects of SADC 
free trade on output, trade, employment and customs revenue for 27 traded 
goods for the member countries in 1993.  He pointed to the data difficulties 
and warned that the results should be treated with caution. Moreover, his 
quantitative model was not complemented by significant field interviews, and 
this also affected his results. The agricultural sector was not disaggregated by 
tariff line so that no sensitive products were identified. For the agricultural 
sector as a whole, however, there was some modest creation and expansion of 
                     
2 The effective rate of protection in market j is measured by : 
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Qj   =  value in market prices of output sold in market j 
WQj   =  value in world prices of output sold in market j 
tj   =  nominal rate of protection of output sold in market j 
Wqi  =  value in world prices of traded input I 
Mi   =  value in domestic prices of traded input I 
ti   =  nominal rate of protection on traded input I 
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production.   
 
A study of the establishment of a common external tariff (CET) for COMESA 
(Imani, 1995) covered all the SADC countries except Botswana and South 
Africa which are not members of COMESA. The methodology was based on 
two related concepts: the ERP (which has been mentioned above) and 
domestic resource cost (DRC).  The DRC measures the economic 
competitiveness of enterprises in the absence of trade policies. It is the 
opportunity cost of using a factor of production to produce one unit of output 
divided by the international value added by producing that unit. 
 
Simply put, the DRC ratio for a commodity is shown as: 
 
 DRCj = DCj / IVAj  where  
 Dcj   =  the domestic cost of producing j with factors valued at their 
social opportunity costs, and  
 IVAj  =  value added to activity j at border prices3( (Greenaway & 
Milner, 1993). 
 
If DRCj  > 1, it indicates a comparative disadvantage in production since the 
value of the factors of production used exceeds the value of foreign exchange 
earned or saved.  Conversely, if DRCj  < 1, it indicates a comparative 
advantage since there is a net foreign exchange gain, and the production 
process should be encouraged since it is efficient in its use of domestic 
resources.   
 
The COMESA CET Study depended on a questionnaire survey, with a widely 
varying response rate because of the data requirements, and consequently it 
did not cover all sub-sectors. Thus, it provided little comparability for our 
purposes.   
                     
3  This equation may be more formally written as: 
  DRCj
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where vhj =amount of the hth domestic factor of production used in the jth value-
adding process (of traded goods); Sh = the shadow price of the hth factor; Vh n  
=amount of the hth domestic factor of production used in the nth value-adding 
process (of non-traded goods); dn j = amount of non-traded good n used in the 
production of a unit of good j; rf= repatriated return per unit of the foreign-owned 
factor of production f; vfj = amount of the foreign-owned factor of production f used 
in the production of one unit of good j; mij = amount of the traded input i used in 





DRCs were also used in studies of the effects of trade liberalisation in the 
maize and beef sectors in South Africa (Jooste et al., 1996) and Zimbabwe 




ERPs have been calculated in some SADC countries, and these were used in 
the course of the study. The analysis showed that the most sensitive 
agricultural commodity was sugar, while dairy, cereals and milling, and 
tobacco were also sensitive.  However, the issue of cereals, particularly maize, 
is complicated by the political sensitivity of it being the staple food in the 
SADC region. Many countries have administrative controls over the import of 
maize, and changes in the maize price have led to social unrest on occasions. 
Thus, this is an issue which has to be approached with caution. The list of 
potentially sensitive agricultural products is contained in Table 3. 
 
Table 3.  Potentially Sensitive Agricultural Products 
 
Product  Country 
 Grain milling products  Malawi, Namibia 
 Tobacco  Malawi, Mauritius, South Africa 
 Edible fruit and nuts  Mauritius 
  Coffee, tea and spices  (Malawi), (Mauritius) 
  Meat  Namibia 
  Dairy produce  South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
  Sugar  (Malawi), South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania 
  Cereals  Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
 
 
Source:  Imani (1997 b) 
 
Botswana, Lesotho and Mozambique did not appear to have any agricultural 
commodities which were sensitive to SADC free trade, while it was 
impossible, given the absence of data, to determine Angola’s position. 
Mozambique and Angola, in fact, are in a rather different position to the rest 
of SADC as a result of civil wars and their transition from command to market 
economies. The main areas of sensitivity for them will be those in which 
efforts are being made to resuscitate food production and estate crops as well 
as to reconstruct and rehabilitate physical infrastructure. Both countries wish 




would require short- to medium-term protection. Examples are milk in 
Mozambique during the period that farmers are purchasing cattle to restock 
their herds, and maize in both countries. The manufacturing sector, including 
agro-industry, at present consists largely of infant industries because of the 
scale of rehabilitation required.  
The major categories of sensitive products shown in Table 3 will now be 
considered.  
 
(i)  Sugar: South Africa is not the most efficient sugar producer in the 
region, largely because climatic conditions are less favourable than in 
other producing countries. Sugar is one of ten industries for which 
special strategies are being developed by the Department of Trade and 
Industry. The industry is important in the economies of two provinces, 
it is a major employer as well as foreign exchange earner, and it has 
been in the forefront of schemes to develop small-scale African 
agriculture with 22 per cent of the cane now being produced by small 
growers. The South African Sugar Association (SASA) is pushing for 
the adoption of a SADC Protocol for the product. This has not been well 
received in some of the other producing countries which argue that 
they would not be able to take advantage of SADC free trade in order to 
exploit their comparative advantages and supply the South African 
market. The SASA argument is not based so much on protection per se 
as on the distorted nature of the world sugar trade, particularly the 
differential access enjoyed by the various producing countries to 
preferential world markets. The argument is that the growth of the 
industry would be better achieved if producing countries were to 
cooperate in world marketing negotiations, anti-dumping procedures, 
research and technology rather than by disrupting local markets.  
 
  Sugar is the only sensitive product for Swaziland but for different 
reasons. The country has developed a comparative advantage within 
the SACU for the location of sugar-based processing industries, and this 
has led to a dispute with the SASA which is concerned about the loss of 
domestic sales to industries which have relocated their processing 
operations to Swaziland. The Swaziland Sugar Association wants free 
trade within the SACU, and thus has resisted South African proposals 
for a Protocol limiting such trade. But it also does not wish to lose its 
comparative advantage monopoly in the SACU market - something it 
might lose if SADC free trade allowed access for the product from 
Zimbabwe and Malawi as well as in the long term from Mozambique 
and Zambia.  




  However, Tongaat-Hulett Sugar Limited’s expansion in Mozambique 
and Zambia, together with the recent takeover by South Africa’s Illovo 
Sugar of the Lonrho interests in Swaziland, Malawi and Mauritius 
means that the industry is now a transnational one within SADC, and 
the implications for free trade could be significant as the parent 
companies use their influence to limit cross-border marketing. Already, 
it appears that the South Africa-Swaziland dispute has been settled by 
the mediation of such transnational interests. 
 
  Both Tanzania and Zambia saw sugar as one of the agro-industrial 
products which might require short- or medium-term protection while 
the industry, which is potentially competitive, is being developed in the 
general process of economic transformation. The COMESA CET study, 
interestingly enough, found that the sugar industry in Zambia had 
negative value added at world prices and would be expected to fail 
under greater competition from free trade. However, this static analysis 
fails to take into account the potential of an industry which has been 
seriously disadvantaged in the past both by poor macro-economic 
policies and the neglect of physical infrastructure. The Zimbabwe sugar 
industry considers that it could gain regional markets in a free trade 
area, but recognises that South Africa’s concerns are a major stumbling 
block. Malawi’s sugar industry should be regionally competitive, but it 
faces severe transport problems at present which are increasing its 
production costs.  
 
  It now appears likely that the SASA’s proposals, supported by the 
Department of Trade and Industry, for a SADC Sugar Protocol will be 
adopted. 
 
(ii)  Grain milling and cereals: Grain millers in the smaller economies such 
as Malawi face two major problems: they do not enjoy economies of 
scale, and there are no effective anti-dumping measures. Thus, they 
would be unlikely to be able to withstand competition from larger mills 
in South Africa and Zimbabwe. Also vulnerable are the small-scale 
peasant maize growers who lack the marketing and management skills 
to compete with commercial producers in South Africa and Zimbabwe. 
The severity of the threat to these growers could be determined with 
accuracy only if there were a comparative price study in the SADC 
region.  
 
  In Mozambique, millers felt that they could be competitive if they were 




with bakeries and develop brand loyalty with customers. They were 
also concerned with the problem of countering dumping within a free 
trade area.  
 
  The grain milling and cereal sectors are heavily protected in Namibia, 
imports being restricted so long as local maize and wheat are available. 
Namibia is not self-sufficient in cereals, and much of the maize and 
wheat is grown under unfavourable climatic conditions, e.g., according 
to the Namibian Agricultural Union only 35 per cent of the existing 
production area can produce maize economically, and alternative land 
use would be more economic. A tariff reduction schedule over eight 
years would probably be sufficient to enable the milling industry in 
Namibia to restructure and to compete in a free trade area.  
 
  In other studies of this sector in the SADC region, Takavarasha et al 
(1996) found that maize production in Zimbabwe is efficient for 
domestic but not for export markets except perhaps for immediate 
regional markets because of the high transport costs associated with 
such a bulky commodity. Of the producing regions in South African 
itself, Jooste et al (1996) found that only the Highveld under irrigation 
had a comparative advantage. Kafuli and Mawela (1996) quote World 
Bank calculations of DRCs for Zambian maize production, all well 
below unity indicating a comparative advantage. Despite this finding, 
the Bank’s policy recommendation was that Zambia should not 
concentrate on exports since other agricultural activities could make 
better use of domestic resources. 
 
  However, the position of maize relative to these other crops could be 
strengthened if world grain prices rise under the WTO as predicted by 
the FAO. This would further strengthen Zambia’s regional prospects. In 
addition, from the point of view of food security - a high priority for 
SADC - there is a good regional reason why Zambia should increase its 
production of cereals. There are significant annual variations in grain 
supplies in the various SADC countries, and this could be mitigated by 
the development of new areas of production in, for example, north-
eastern Zambia which is less susceptible than the rest of SADC to 
drought. Moreover, only the Southern and Eastern African region itself 
can supply the type of maize, i.e., white maize, which is demanded by 
consumers; as Weeks and Subasat (1996) point out, the resistance of 
local consumers to imported yellow maize has been a persistent 
problem in emergency food aid programmes. 




(iii)  Meat: A SADC free trade area could present a problem for Namibian 
beef exports. At present Namibia enjoys preferential access to the South 
African market under the SACU, but SADC free trade would confer 
similar access to Zimbabwean producers. The competition will be in the 
sphere of beef cuts rather than live animals. South Africa takes some 58 
per cent of Namibia’s exports of beef cuts. The precise extent of the 
threat, however, can be gauged only if there is more detailed 
information on price factors, South Africa’s readiness to shift import 
sources, the quality of Namibian versus Zimbabwean beef, and so on, 
all of which were beyond the scope of the SADC trade protocol study.  
 
  In Zimbabwe, however, the meat industry was confident that it could 
gain market share in South Africa in respect of cut beef. Zimbabwe’s 
concern in the meat industry relates more to the imports side and stems 
from problems concerning the rules of origin. In terms of the Lomé 
Convention, EU beef cannot be sold in Zimbabwe. By contrast, South 
Africa imports beef from the EU and, in a SADC free trade area, the 
danger for producers in Zimbabwe is that EU beef exported to South 
Africa could filter across the border as South African produce if there 
were inadequate policing of rules of origin. Takavarasha et al. (1996) 
found low DRCs in Zimbabwe, indicating that that country was an 
efficient producer both for regional and international markets.  
 
  The marketing of meat in South Africa has been deregulated, and beef 
is mainly imported. Jooste et al. (1996) calculated DRCs for five 
producing regions in South Africa, and found that only the Western 
Cape had a comparative advantage in production; the Free State was 
marginal at 1.02. 
 
(iv)  Coffee, tea and spices: Malawi is facing increased transport costs which 
might necessitate initial protection for its tea industry from regional 
competition. In the longer term, however, this industry should be 
regionally competitive. The Mauritian tea industry could be sensitive to 
duty-free imports, but this is a declining industry and the plantations 
are gradually giving way to sugar.  
 
(v)  Tobacco: This is a controversial product because of growing social 
pressures worldwide for governments to limit smoking. Thus, Malawi’s 
increasing dependence on tobacco is unfortunate, and government 
policy anyway ought to be one of diversification. Under SADC free 
trade, Zimbabwean processing costs might be lower and this could 





  It is interesting to note that studies on the proposed EU-South Africa 
Free Trade Agreement have shown that duty-free access of EU 
agricultural products to the South African market would have 
significant adverse effects for the livestock and meat products industry 
in Namibia, Botswana and Zimbabwe, sugar in Swaziland and grain 
milling in all countries (Imani, 1997a). This is so even given the 
existence of free trade within the SACU. The reason for the adverse 
impact is that the EU pays high producer subsidies (49 per cent) as well 
as export subsidies in the agricultural sector. According to Goodison 
(1996), this system of producer and export subsidies will remain in 
place so long as the EU retains its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). 
Stevens (1997) argues that there will be no significant changes to this 
policy for the next few years. 
 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TRADE PROTOCOL 
 
The SADC ministers have decided, in line with the Imani recommendations, 
to proceed as follows: 
 
1.  Member countries will identify, at the 6-digit HS level, products which 
could fall into the following three categories: 
 
  (i)  immediate liberalisation list, i.e., products currently traded 
within SADC for which immediate zero tariffs would not 
be problematic; 
 
  (ii)  temporary exclusion list, i.e., products which a country 
considers sensitive; and 
 
  (iii)  gradual liberalisation list, i.e., all products not in the other 
two lists and for which tariffs would be phased out 
gradually (over a maximum of eight years). 
 
2.  For the last two lists, tariffs will be reduced on a linear basis to zero at 
the end of eight years after the Protocol takes effect. However, some 
highly sensitive products may require a longer period. Reductions for 
sensitive products will start later than those for products on the gradual 
liberalisation list. 
 
3.  The reductions will be asymmetric because of South Africa’s trade 




of the non-SACU countries. To offset this, the non-SACU countries will 
liberalise their tariffs towards the BLNS countries more rapidly than 
towards South Africa. 
 
Although the precise details have still to be agreed upon, the process could be 
fairly smooth. A high proportion of intra-SADC trade is already duty free, 
largely through the SACU but also through bilateral free trade or zero-rated 
raw material imports. For the non-SACU countries a significant proportion is 
about to become duty free under the CBI and COMESA, and presumably such 
trade will fast-track the SADC tariff reduction schedule. Most of the tariffs 
which will need to be reduced in fact relate to non-SACU countries’ imports 
from South Africa, with a smaller volume of trade comprising SACU 
(especially South African) imports from the non-SACU countries.  
 
A major problem with a differential (more rapid)reduction of tariffs by non-
SACU countries against BLNS than against South Africa could relate to trade 
deflection, for example, the evasion of duties by goods from South Africa 
entering BLNS under SACU free trade and then being re-exported to a non-
SACU country without adequate rules-of-origin identification. Clearly, 
appropriate implementation of rules of origin will be necessary, although this 





Free trade theoretically should enable each country to exploit its comparative 
advantages. Protectionism prevents this: it favours domestic producers and 
keeps out goods from more efficient producing countries. But free trade also 
requires the removal of subsidies and non-tariff barriers. South African 
agricultural subsidies are lower than those in all OECD countries except New 
Zealand and Australia (Absa Bank, 1996), and are being phased out so that 
this should not be a major problem for SADC free trade. The position is 
different with regard to other non-tariff barriers, however. 
 
The establishment of a SADC free trade area differs from that of many other 
integration schemes in that it starts from a position of significant polarisation 
among member countries with regard to the geographic coverage of the 
transport network, the standards of physical infrastructure, and the 
operational efficiency of transport modes. South Africa, with a transport 
sector comparable in sophistication to that of industrialised countries, is at one 
end of the spectrum; at the other end are other countries (Zambia, Tanzania, 




decayed or destroyed. Inadequate transport networks present a substantial 
non-tariff barrier in these countries yet they have enormous agricultural 
potential. If all SADC countries are to take advantage of free trade in 
agriculture, farmers must be able to obtain their inputs and market their 
outputs with assurance, and improvements to the transport infrastructure are 
therefore critical. Prevailing patterns of intra-regional trade in agricultural 
commodities are distorted by these transport differentials. It is not just farm 
production costs but also distribution costs which influence competitiveness 
in a free trade area; so long as transport non-tariff barriers exist, therefore, 
transport costs will be high and will prevent farmers and agro-industries in a 
country such as Zambia from reaching their potential. 
 
Poor transport systems, however, are not the only non-tariff barrier to 
increased intra-trade in agricultural commodities. Storage facilities for grain 
are important, and farmers also need access to credit, long-term finance to tide 
them over the natural disasters to which the region is prone, and reliable 
telecommunications.  
 
Financial, technical and marketing support is especially important for small-
scale farmers. The development of small-scale peasant agriculture is an 
important policy aim in most SADC countries yet this segment is often 
ignored in studies. In Malawi, for example, small-scale peasant farmers 
growing maize and soya have found it very difficult to compete with 
commercial growers from Zimbabwe under a bilateral free trade agreement. 
SADC governments, therefore, should pay careful attention to the impact of 
free trade on emerging small farmers. These farmers are a diverse group, 
operating under varying tenurial, agro-climatic and economic conditions in 
the SADC region. Free trade in agriculture could be a sensitive issue not only 
for commercial producers but also for the small-scale sector. Strict rules on 
dumping will be required in the SADC free trade area to ensure that small 
farmers are not further disadvantaged vis a vis large producers. 
 
Dynamic aspects of free trade are not quantifiable but also have to be taken 
into account. They include positive effects on demand, investment and the 
emergence of new types of production and directions of trade; efficiency gains 
through greater competition; gains from the lowering of administrative 
barriers; and benefits from technology transfer. There will be some 
sensitivities in the negotiations on the phasing out of agricultural tariffs but 
many of SADC’s traditional agricultural exports are to non-regional markets 
anyway, and the move towards free trade could open up new possibilities for 
the sector and bring about greater regional food security. 
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